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PLANNING AND RISK
Abstract. The notions of planning, forecasting, efficiency, decision-
making, optimality, uncertainty, risk and safety are elucidated. It is claimed
that public participation in any technological implementation is essential for
improving the quality of life of likely affected people.
1 . Plan n in g
A plan is a prescription for a sequence of actions or operations on natu-
ral or artificial things (i) performed by rational beings, (ii) with the aim of
causing specific changes in these things, (iii) changes that are valuable to
someone (the performer or someone else).
In a planned action we can distinguish the following components:
(i) The set of desiderata.
(ii) The set of resources (natural, social, cultural, or whatever).
(iii) The limitations or constraints.
(iv) The set of goals (some desiderata can be unrealistic or non-
attainable at a given time).
(v)  The design and planning, taking into account the resources, goals,
and constraints.
(vi) The decision making.
(vii) The implementation or sequence of actions.
(viii) The study of the effects of the actions and their evaluation.
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In particular, the sequence of any technological action is as follows
(Alexander 1971, Ostrofsky 1977, Simon 1969, Vidosic 1969, Tobar-
Arbulu 1984a Ch. 3):
(i) Primitive needs (general desiderata).
(ii) Needs analysis (choosing the realistic goals from the desiderata).
(iii) Feasibility studies.
(iv) Design proper:
a) Synthesis of solutions
b) Criterion modeling
c) Optimization
d) Prediction of system behavior
e) Testing and simplification
(v) Decision (adopt, discard, modify).
(vi) Planning (organization plan of execution of design and produc-
tion).
(vii) Implementation of design.
(viii) Testing of performance.
(ix) Evaluation of performance.
(x) (New cycle)
Re m a r k
For participative plans, democratic control and public participation, see
Ackoff 1970, 1974, 1981, Alexander et al. 1975, 1979, Tobar-Arbulu
1984a, 1986a. Here we stress the fact that every plan has to be evaluated
before, during, and after implementation.
A good plan should have the following characteristics:
Planning and risk 93
(i) Purposefulness (it should indicate the aims or goals it serves).
(ii) Feasibility.
(iii) Inner consistency and cohesion.
(iv) Reliability.
(v) Flexibility or elasticity.
(vi) Specificity (it should be reasonably detailed).
(vii) Long-term view (the plan should be constructed to cover the lon-
gest possible period in the light of existing knowledge of future
conditions).
(viii) Maximum simplicity, if possible (the simpler the plan, the more
easily we can bridge the gap between conception and realization;
in modern design this not usually the case).
(ix) A clear deadline (the date of the completion of work must be spe-
cified taking into account point (v)).
2 . Fo reca s t in g  a n d  p la n n in g
A forecast provides a statement of future possibilities. On the basis of
the forecast, a plan is developed.
The plan describes a sequence of activities which is intended to achieve
some goal or other. Once the plan is developed, a program, which is a state-
ment of the resources which will be committed to carrying out the plan, can
be devised. The program allocates specific resources to particular activities
and assigns specific people to particular tasks. Once the resources are avai-
lable, the program can be implemented. This involves the expenditure of
resources and carrying out of activity by people. After the implementation of
the program, it is necessary to evaluate the results: Was the plan successfu-
lly carried out? Did the expenditure of the resources achieve the desired
results? Was the performance of the activity satisfactory? The evaluation
amounts to a determination of the present status, and its comparison with
the status which was expected on the basis of the plan. By taking the findings
of the evaluation as a new starting point a new forecast can be prepared and
the cycle can begin again.
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The role of forecasts in planning may be expressed as follows:
a) The forecast identifies limits beyond which it is not possible to go.
b) It establishes feasible rates of progress, so that the plan can be made
to take full advantage of such rates.
c) It describes alternatives which are open and can be chosen from.
d) It indicates possibilities which might be achieved, if desired.
e) It provides a point of reference for the plan; the plan can thus be
compared with the forecast at any point in time, to determine whet-
her it can still be fulfilled, or whether, because of the changes in the
forecast, it has to changed.
f) It furnishes warning signals, which can alert the decision maker that
it will not be possible to continue present activities.
(See more in Lenze 1962.)
Since rational actions, in particular long-range actions, are bound to
have side-effects, they must be planned and forecast using different techni-
ques (Martino 1972, Jantsch 1967). (For the whole cycle in the context of
so-called “technology transfer” —taking into account needs, resources, cons-
traints, impact on society, and kind of development— from technological
forecasting to technology transfer to technology assessment, see Tobar-
Arbulu 1986b).
3 . Efficien cy a n d  p la n n in g
Given the law statement “If M then G (with a certain probability p)”,
where M stands for means and G for goal, a “rule schema” is of the form “to
attain G use M”, or “in order not to obtain G refrain from using M”.
 Law statement 
Feasibility
Valuation
M  G (“If M then G with probability p”)
M is technically feasible
G is valuable and desirable (Moreover
V(G) >> V(M))
_ _ _ _ _
M! (Do M, or M ought to be done)
Re m a rks
1. While in science we deal with facts related by “is”, in technology we
use only nomologically grounded (or justified) rules, norms, or proposals.
Further, we introduce the predicate “ought to be done” to apply to an
action.
2. Instead of “x ought to do Y”, we may deal with propositions of the
form “If x does Y, then Z happens (with a certain probability p) and Z is
valuable” (Churchman 1961). We put it this way because there is no logical
deduction of ought- statements from is- statements —as noted long ago by
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Hume (1739-40) and more recently by Simon (1976 Ch. 3). Therefore, the
basic pattern of a rule of action has to be justified in practice as well as theo-
retically.
The degree of efficiency of a means to a given goal is usually taken to
be the product of the probability of its outcome by the value of the outcome:
e = P(G/M). V(G)
We can evaluate the goal G, V(G), and for a given means M, we know
how to evaluate “M  G & S’, where S stands for side-effects (Tobar-Arbulu
1985b). Therefore, if we know the probability, P(G/M), to attain G using
means M, we will know the degree of efficiency of the whole operation,
including the evaluation of the side-effects S. (See Leontief (1977 Ch. 6) for
the evaluation of pollution in the economic structure.)
One means is more efficient than another if, and only if, it employs
some less valuable means to arrive at a more valuable result.
Not only do our actions, though rational, have unintended and unfore-
seen consequences, but it is clear enough that no planning, in particular no
social planning, can be perfect. This is because planners do not have an
exhaustive knowledge of present social systems. Further, (i) social problems
are many-sided and their solution requires the participation of experts from
different fields as well as public participation (Tobar-Arbulu 1984a Ch. 3);
(ii) since social systems are in constant evolution, emergent properties —in
particular unpredictable ones— can occur; (iii) since sociosystems (political,
cultural, and economic) are related to each other, the events in one of them
influence the events in the others; (iv) even in a given sociosystem, individual
actions and decisions can alter the system itself. All this, however, does not
prevent us from making plans (short-, medium-, and long-term ones). In par-
ticular, large scale actions, such as the development of a nation, affect huge
numbers of people. Although in these situations flexible plans are preferred
to rigid ones, more often than not they produce unpredictable effects. More
and deeper social science, more and better sociotechnologies may, and even-
tually can, improve situations of this kind.
The main problem in modern societies is how to combine public partici-
pation (1) with socioeconomic planning. Even when selecting the long-range
(1) The problem ofparticipation is related to theproblems of power and bureaucracy (Rus-
sell 1938, Galbraith 1967-78, 1973-75, 1983). Although these problems deserves further
elucidation elsewhere, let us stress here that participation should involve (i) the choice
of long-term goals, (ii) the choice of the optimal means to achieve these goals, (iii) the
justification of both goals and means. Instead of dealing with endless ideological deba-
tes, participation in any political regime whatsoever ought to be measured, for, as Ale-
xander et al. (1975 p. 38) observe, “only the people can guide the process of organic
growth in a community. They know the most about their own needs”. Within the Mar-
xian school see Marcovic and Petrovic (1979) for a serious critical elucidation of the
concepts of praxis, alienation (in particular alienated labor), self-management in the
context of the 1960’s and early 1970’s in Yugoslavia and for a critique of the bureau-
cratic establishment. The self-management system, which proceeds from the principle
96 Jo sé  Fé lix To b a r  Arb u lu
goals most likely to be achieved with the available resources, the greater the
participation of the people affected by the plan, the more effective its imple-
mentation will be (Ackoff 1970, 1974, 1981, Alexander et al. 1975, 1979).
Further, in social planning both Small is Beautiful and Large is Beautiful
are good slogans, depending on the size and characteristics of the problems
at issue. Besides, when dealing with management, each type of sociosystem
requires its own study of efficiency. Thus, Greiner (1972) has identified seve-
ral phases in the development of a business firm, each of them requiring a
different kind of management. (See Marcovic and Petrovic (1979) and
Milenkovitch (1971) for the Yugoslav experience, where different ethnic
groups are combining economic planning within a framework of a mixed
economy and political decentralization.)
4 . P la n n in g  a n d  r e n e wa b le  r e so u rce s
It is obvious that the fossil fuels are exhaustible. Likewise, it is also
obvious that a minority of selfish humans can organize themselves to exploit
the majority’s dilemmas. A glance at the basic economic, political, cultural,
and social problems of present-day society tells us that the solution to these
problems is through invention and development. This involves the design of
physical, chemical, biological, and social artifacts so that these artifacts —in
the hands of competent users— can provide so much performance per erg of
energy, kilo of material, and second of time as to make them feasible and
economical in order to provide a sustainable standard of living for all indivi-
duals of any given society. It is obvious that attaining these goals requires
enormous amounts of energy. Besides, our contemporary advanced stan-
dard of living, at least in some countries, can be partly sustained by new
sources of energy: sun, wind, ocean, and, in the near future, nuclear fusion.
It is then clear that this standard can be attained by artifacts that emancipate
that each development decision ought to be made at that particular management level at
which some given goal can be beste and most fully achieved, presupposes multilevel
management, i.e., management at more levels than is the case with centralized systems
(Stajanovic 1982). Two issues arise when choosing a particular level of management:
(i) what the goals of the higher levels mean to the lower levels under the conditions of
self-management, (ii) what the optimal decision is, and how it is reached. (See Stajano-
vic 1982 for planning procedures from a section in a plant —the smallest organizational
unit— to the enterprise and various forms of integration of enterprises, to municipalities
to republics and the whole federation of republics, as well as for the control of plan
implementation and the evaluation of the need for corrective measures.) Stajanovic
(1982 p. 41ff) classifies some open problems in the Yugoslav system of self-management
planning into three groups: (i) problems related to the selection of development priori-
ties (i.e., selection of priorities in the medium-term development of the country, since
Yugoslavia is a multinational state), (ii) problems which stem from the industry-
territory relationship (i.e., maximization of gross income per employed person versus
maximation of gross income per citizen: finding the optimal relation between industry
and territory is essential in the process of planning): (iii) problems from the domain of
planning methodology.
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humans from piped, wired, and metered exploitation of the many by the few.
We might christen these artifacts leading to the fulfillment of human needs
“livingry” in contradistinction to “weaponry”.
We advocate a technological, political, cultural, economic, and biologi-
cal reform and improvement of the environment so that life may continue to
be worthwhile. As technologists we are greatly interested in all that is happe-
ning on the political-economic scene and in the impact of unforeseen techno-
logical events upon it. We see, for instance, how computers have altered the
whole scene, to the point where some people have long since been discussing
“artificial intelligence” (Tobar-Arbulu 1984b). We are students of the effecti-
veness of technology in all its expected and unexpected alterings of the envi-
ronment and human behavior. With Fuller (1983 p. XX) we know, “that
technologically humanity now has the opportunity, for the first time in its
history, to operate our planet in such a manner as to support and accomoda-
te all humanity at a substantially more advanced standard of living that any
humans have ever experienced”, if we are not “atom-bombed into extinction
by the pre-emptive folly of the political puppet administrators fronting for
the exclusively-for-money-making supranational corporations” weaponry
industry of the now hopelessly bankrupt greatest-weapons-manufacturing
nation (the USA)” (op. cit. p. XXXI).
Social problems, such as poverty or the decay of urban centers, are
extremely important. The danger of nuclear war, important as it is, should
not make us blind to other problems and dangers. “Many in the Reagan
administration”, claims Weisskopf (1982 p. 58), “obviously disagree. They
seem to argue that the Russian military danger is so great that we must put
all our money there [in the arms race] and let the poor go hungry”. Human
beings, however, are more terrestrial or worldy than ever before. It is evident
that the degree of technological development, if realistically appraised and
articulated, now shows that all humanity can reach a state of comprehensive
technological development adequate to provide a “billionaire’s level of living
on an indefinitely sustainable base for all of the over four billion human pas-
sengers now aboard Spaceship Earth” (Fuller 1983 p. 80). The key point is
to shift “from weaponry to livingry production” (op. cit. p. 83). While both
superpowers have jointly spent six and a half trillion dollars in developing
the present capability to destroy all humanity within one hour, humankind at
large knows that the same sum spent in the direction of improving the lives
of the deprived many might really have brought about better results than the
suicide of the entire race. All of us should be involved in converting all indus-
trial production from killingry to livingry products and service systems,
which allow more participation and collaboration in the solutions to the pro-
blems that beset present-day societies. Further, we know (Galbraith 1967-
78, 1973-75, 1983) that economic problems are related to political problems,
and in particular to power (1).
Given the ecological disasters brought about by the irrational exploita-
tion of resources in the past and the growth of population and consumption,
a new discipline, bioeconomics, has been developed to deal with the manage-
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ment of renewable resources from forests to fisheries to prairies. Interdepen-
dent and multidisciplinary studies (biological and economic) are being
carried out so that harvesting and conservation may be balanced: the rate of
harvesting should be, ideally, equal to the renewal rate. The planner should
make recommendations based on mathematical models fed with empirical
data for the optimal rate of harvesting. It is the task of the decision maker to
decide, in view of the information available, and taking into account possible
extinction of the species in question or irreversible destruction of resources,
as well as the degree of erosion and desertification and the population nutri-
tional needs, the pace and rate of the harvesting of renewable resources.
5 . Pla n n in g  a n d  d ecis io n -m a kin g
While choosing is making a selection among alternatives on their basis
of their probable outcomes, deciding is making a selection between alternati-
ves on the basis of the results of a comparison, and planning is making a
succession of decisions prior to the final action in relation to an incentive
(Bindra 1976 p. 295).
The behavior of animals frequently consists of chain of causes of
action, continuous or interrupted, that have been prepared in advance of
their execution. Planned behavior is thus related to a common goal, and may
be seen as involving a number of subgoals that are intermediate steps for
reaching the specific more remote goal. From a psychological point of view
(Miller et al. 1960) a plan is defined as “any hierarchical process in the orga-
nism that controls the order in which a sequence of operations is to be per-
formed”, and involves a flexible neural program. However, this flexible neu-
ral program still remains to be characterized. According to Bindra (1976
Ch. 10 and 13), the whole matter boils down to the fact that certain situa-
tions contain stimuli that can activate the contingency organizations capable
of exciting the neural system(s) related to a plan, and this in turn leads to the
recall of the decisions reached in connection with certain other stimuli.
On the other hand, forecasts, and in particular technological forecasts,
are not their own justification (Ayres 1969, Bright 1967, Jantsch 1967,
1972). In fact, every technological forecast is intended to be used as decision
information. The sole justification of a technological forecast is its utility in
making a decision. This is true regardless of the precision or rigor of the met-
hods of forecasting (see Martino 1972, for different methods used in forecas-
ting), and the accuracy of the data base used. We will discuss below some of
the features common to several areas in which technological forecasting can
be used. (For details of applying technological forecasts to planning and
decision making in specific areas, see Ayres 1969, Jantsch 1967, 1972,
Martino 1972.)
A plan is a sequence of decisions, each related to the other. However, a
plan may result from a decision to attempt to achieve a certain goal. Thus a
decision may lead to planning, just as planning may lead to a decision. In the
following, we will consider decision on an individual basis.
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Definition 1. Decision-making is the act of selecting one from among a
set of feasible courses of action.
Remarks
1. Decision-making is previous to action, which in turn involves some
change or other in some present situation.
2. The course of actions must be feasible.
3. There must be a set of courses of action available. The members of
the set must be distinguishably different, either in the actions to be taken or
the means to be employed.
4. Decision-making implies some limitations on resources. If all the
available courses of action can be pursued simultaneously, no decision is
needed.
5. As for optimality, in most practical situations a “good decision” can
be described as one which “gains the most return for the least cost”. Howe-
ver, this point needs further study to provide the decision-maker with some
guide for choosing one course of action over another. (See below, Section 7.)
6 . Th e  p la n n in g  p r o ce s s
What is the nature of planning? Is long-range planning any different
from medium or short range planning? How are planning and decision-
making related? These are questions that we shall try to deal with here.
Remarks
1. According to Drucker (1959) planning (i) is not forecasting; and (ii)
is not an attempt to eliminate risks.
2. A plan is not a precise statement of what is going to happen, but
rather a statement of what looks like a reasonable course of action in the
light of available information.
3. Because the future is uncertain, decisions made in the present commit
resources in the present that are inevitably put at risk. The purpose of plan-
ning is not to eliminate risk, since that is often impossible, but to secure that
the risks taken are the right risks.
Definition 2. Planning is the process of preparing a set of decisions for
action in the future, directed at achieving some goal by optimal means.
Remarks
1. Planning implies rational activity.
2. In planning one tries to generate a set of possible decisions rather
than actually take the decisions. The point is that the planning activity is
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usually carried out by people other than the decision maker(s) responsible
for the ultimate implementation. Thus the results of planning are often
approved and executed by people other than the planner(s). (For the respon-
sibility of technologists, planners and action-performers see Tobar-Arbulu
1986a Ch. 6, 1986c.)
3. While decisions can presumably be considered one at a time, plan-
ning must of necessity deal with a set of interdependent and sequentially
related decisions.
4. As Dror (1968a p. 36) asserts, “the significant output of planning is
not the plan itself but the plan’s effect (if any) on social situations”.
5. Planning must be responsive to the goals of the individual(s) or orga-
nization within which the planning is being done.
6. Planning is not just shaping the future to our desires and wants, but
doing this with the most effective and efficient use of the resources available.
A plan provides guidance for all its subordinate elements (recall Sec-
tion 1). The decision to accept the plan (that is, the result of the planning
process) is a decision in the present to carry out certain activities —which
can be improved while they are performed— in the future. At the time a plan
is made, a certain sequence of steps may appear to be the optimal means to
achieve a desired goal. However, as more information becomes available, the
sequence may no longer look as good as it did at the outset. Hence it is
essential that planning be flexible, so that previously made plans can be revi-
sed. Any modern technological plan is flexible throughout its implementa-
tion. This does not mean that modern technology is based on the trial-and-
error method as Popper claims (1974 p. 353). On the contrary, the scientific
method —and in particular its application to complex social situations— is
applied throughout (Tobar-Arbulu 1985c). (For Operations Research as a
technology based on the scientific method and aiming at improving the effec-
tiveness of sociotechnical systems see Tobar-Arbulu 1985d, 1986a Ch. 3.)
A rational plan then is not something which has been approved at cor-
porate or military headquarters once and for all, prescribing in minute detail
the activities of every subordinate action from the present to some point in
the remote future, and which must be followed without undeviation regard-
less of the local situation or of changing conditions. (For the evaluation of
side-effects before, during, and after any technological implementation, see
Tobar-Arbulu 1986b.) A decision maker should be aware that circumstan-
ces change, and that proposed actions may have to be revised because of
these changes.
7 . Lo n g-, m id -, a n d  sh o r t -r a n ge  p la n n in g
How long a long-range plan, or how short a short-range one, is depends
on the individual(s) or the organization and what it is doing. Short-range
planning involves decisions which cannot be postponed for very long. Howe-
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ver, although short-range planning involves only current decisions, it must
look as far ahead as the degree of futurity involved in its decisions.
Long-range planning involves plans that can be postponed for some
length of time. The purpose of a plan is to lay out a general path towards a
goal of the individual(s) or organization so that short-range plans can be
made in conformity with this long-range plan. Without a long-range plan,
there is a real danger that successive short-range plans will be based on expe-
riences of the moment, and that no progress will be made toward the indivi-
dual(s) or organization’s goals even over a period encompassing several
short-range plans.
A mid-range plan covers a time intermediate between the short-and
long-range plans. It is aimed at goals which are intermediate steps to achieve
the long-range goals. It takes its direction from the long-range plan, and in
turn provides direction for the short-range plans.
The level of detail, the precision of the timing, and the degree of com-
pleteness vary among the three types of plans.
8 . Op t im a lity a n d  u n ce r ta in ty
Let us make here some remarks about the optimality of decision
making.
More often than not the resources which are available and which may
be devoted to the achievement of some goal are fixed, and the objective is to
gain as much return as possible from these fixed resources. We can face, in
principle, two kinds of problems:
(i) Which investment (of money, energy, materials, or whatever) gives
the greatest return; and
(ii) The converse situation, namely where some precisely determined
return is to be achieved, a lesser return being acceptable, and a
greater one superfluous.
In (i) the objetive is to maximize returns for a fixed cost. In (ii) the
objective is to gain the desired return at the lowest possible cost. A common
example of situation (ii) is the practice of inviting bids on a set of specifica-
tions, say, the construction of a road, dam, or whatever. The desired return,
in terms of performance, floor space, or whatever, has been specified. Awar-
ding the contract to the lowest bidder obtains those returns at the lowest
cost. (Not only monetary cost for side-effects must also be taken into
account.)
The most general case is the situation where neither the costs nor the
returns are fixed. There is a range of possible return between the lower limit
which is just acceptable, and an upper limit where additional returns become
superfluous. Likewise, there is some upper limit on the acceptable cost, and
some lower limit (possibly zero) defining the least amount which is to be
spent. Optimality involves a balancing of costs and returns, i.e., selecting the
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particular point where the additional returns above the acceptable minimum
are just worth the additional costs, and further returns would not be worth
the further costs of obtaining them. (Operations Research, Systems Engineer-
ing, and Systems Analysis deal with this problem of optimality when neither
return nor costs are fixed, see Tobar-Arbulu 1985d, 1986a Ch. 3.) Better
quality of performance can always be obtained at greater cost, but at some
point the decision-maker must conclude that the extra return is no longer
worth paying for. The key to the decision problem is, in fact, identifying this
point.
Since decisions are not made in a vacuum, the decision maker must
know the courses of action open to him, the cost of each, the return of each,
and their side-effects. However, he often cannot know the full costs, the full
returns, and the full side-effects of each course of action. Many are too
remote in time or space to be identified. Many occur as the result of complex
circumstances where probabilistic or stochastic models are applied. Some of
the returns, costs, or side-effects of a course of action do not even become
known until the action has been taken, although all of the significant ones of
each course of action must have been identified prior to the decision. A deci-
sion depends upon the information on which it is based. Information costs
time, effort, and money. Hence a decision-maker who obtains far more infor-
mation than he needs, or who requires more and more confirmation of a
given reasonably valid piece of information, is not making an optimal deci-
sion. The worth of an additional piece of information in this situation is far
less than the cost. Further, the decision-maker who keeps postponing a deci-
sion in the hope of gaining yet more information is not behaving optimally.
He can never have complete information. Once he has sufficient informa-
tion, postponing a decision may result in nothing more than a reduction of
the alternatives open to him, as some of them are eliminated by circum-
stances.
Therefore, information, though necessary, is always incomplete. Hence
the decision about how much information to gather, and how much time or
resources to spend for getting more of it, may be as important as the basic
decision for which the information is being gathered. This situation leads us
to the problem of uncertainty, which is not only that the decision-maker has
incomplete information, but also that the information he does have may
involve uncertainty, either because he uses stochastic law statements or
because the feasibility of some course of action involves some risk or other.
We can divide decisions made in conditions of uncertainty into three
classes:
(i) decisions under certainty;
(ii) decisions under risk; and
(iii) decisions under uncertainty.
Class (i) deals with decisions whose outcome is known with perfect cer-
tainty, i.e., by application of deterministic law statements where the bounda-
ry conditions are known. Class (ii) deals with decisions for which the outco-
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me is not known, but all the possible outcomes and the odds on each are
known. Class (iii) deals with those for which neither the odds of the outco-
mes nor even perhaps all the possible outcomes are known. In case (iii), if we
are allowed to carry out some experiments we can eventually convert some
of the uncertainty to risk. Likewise, if the probability of an outcome is
almost one, it is as if the decision is made under certainty. In most technolo-
gical projects, it is possible to convert some or all of the risk to a practical
certainty by uncovering a coefficient of safety underlying the outcomes. Risk
and safety go together in modern technology. Let us now take a look at risk.
9 . Risk
Human actions may result in either gains or losses. Risk implies some-
thing unwanted to be avoided. Risk is then associated with results that invol-
ve losses. Risk has been defined in a variety of ways. Most often two con-
cepts, probability of occurrence of an event and the consequences of an
adverse occurrence, are part of the definition. For example, Whyte and Bur-
ton (1980) define risk as the product of probability and the consequences of
an event, where “consequence” is measured by modelling the risk system.
In the case of technological models, the probabilities of different failu-
res, particularly those involving a series of malfunctions, are unknown. A
method of estimating the probability of failure in large technological systems
is the so-called “event tree analysis”. This method works as follows:
(i) An initiating event is postulated —i.e., a pipe break in the primary
system of a nuclear reactor. The tree is then developed (White and
Burton 1980 p. 50) by determining, from a working knowledge of
the reactor, which other systems might affect the subsequent cour-
se of events.
(ii) The systems are ordered in the sequence in which they are expec-
ted to affect the course of events.
(iii) For the initiating event a probability of its occurrence is estimated.
I.e., how often can such pipe breaks be expected to occur? This is
obtained from experience with non-nuclear systems.
(iv) For each of the subsequent events the probability of the system’s
performing its function as well as the probability of its failure is
estimated.
(v) Once the event tree is constructed, the sequence of events in each
accident chain is defined so that it si possible to calculate the con-
sequences for that series.
The event tree approach can thus provide a definition of possible conse-
quences of an accident.
In our view however, one must distinguish risks from natural hazards
—such as floods, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, avalanches, landslides,
tornadoes, hurricanes, high winds storms, all of which occur in nature inde-
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pendently of human presence from risk from man-made hazards— such as
nuclear technology, dams, weather modification, avalanche control techno-
logies and flood control structures. While risk estimation refers to the syste-
matic determination of risk characteristics, evaluation of risk is part of the
decision-making process.
Definition 3. Risk is the potentiality that exists in the realization of an
event that it will have unwanted, negative consequences.
Remarks
1. In particular, when dealing with man-made hazards, risk takes into
account the application of some means to do (or to refrain from doing)
something, in some environment or other, and relative to some individual(s)
or other.
2. The causative event may be a single event, some combination of
events, or a continuous process.
3. The consequences may affect individual(s) or organization(s).
1 0 . Eva lu a t io n  o f r is k s
Let A be an action using means M to achieve goal G. If P(G/M) stands
for the probability to get goal G when using means M, “1 — P(G/M)”, is the
improbability of that event. If we assign means it4 value V(M), the risk can
be evaluated as follows:
R (G/M) = def [1 — P(G/M)] V(M)
A conservative technologist will not perform any action unless
P(G/M) = 1, or unless the safety coefficient covers the risk (2). Safety is
(2) A more complex evaluation of risk can be the following one. Suppose that we face a
situation in which a single catastrophic event may or may not occur. Let P(A/E) be the
probability of A’s occurrence in environment E, and P(-A/E) = 1 — P(A/E) be the pro-
bability of the complementary event. (Recall that “negative” events are interpreted as
the failure of performing them.) Suppose that we can evaluate losses L(A) and L(-A).
According to Raiffa and Schlatfer’s (1961) risk can be evaluated as follows:
R ( A / E )  =  d e f P(A/E) · L(A) + P(—A/E) · L(—A)
Re m a r k s
1. The specification of L(A) is a dificult problem. Losses may not only be monetary,
but they must also include destruction of the environment andpublic goods, and even
guilt if the event is avoidable.
2. If the event affects individual(s), the difficulty increases. Each of several groups of
invididuals can have its own evaluation of losses. Whose perceptions are relevant?
How can conflict in perceived risk be achieved?
3. The view of probability to which we subscribe is the objective propensity following
the probability calculus proposed by Rényi (1970a,b), Tobar-Arbulu (1985e).
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often legislated, so that no harm will result from the proposed use of the
technological action when dealing with the “public” or “collective” or “com-
mon” good —such as air, water and natural parks—; or normalized when
dealing with private ones. (See Tobar-Arbulu 1986d for the notion of basic
human needs.) A major thrust of effective legislation is to make sure of the
non-exploitation and infeasibility of projects involving public harm. The
main requirement for minimal danger is to devise legislation and decision
processes that lead to stable cooperation among the parts involved. The
experience of self-governing organisms gives examples of loyalty to public
concerns (3).
1 1 . De cis io n  a n d  r isk
When facing a specific situation for performinng (or refraining from
performing) an action A in a given environment E, the schematic decision
situation is as follows:
P(A/E)
Do A----------  V(A) -------  r1  ∈ R
Decision
P(—A/E)
Do not do A---------  V(—A) ---  r2 ∈ R
Where V(A) and V(—A) stand for the values of actions A and non-A
respectively (a “negative” action is interpreted as the failure of performing
(3) For different methods and models of evaluating risks see Rowe (1977), Lind (1982),
and Schwing and Alberts (1980). To estimate precisely the probability of an event, such
as a coremelt accident in a nuclear installation, is extremely difficult because of a lack
of directly relevant data, and because it is virtually impossible to model adequately all
the systems involved. According to Rasmussen (1981), the risk associated with a num-
ber n of events is:
 n 
R i s k  =  Σ (probability of event i) x (consequence of  event  i), where 1  ≤ i  ≤ n ,
i=1
namely, the expected value of the consequences. (The consequences may be expressed in
many different ways: lives, dollars, worker-days, and so on.) The application of this eva-
luation requires a common measure of the consequences of all events i, and the corres-
ponding probabilities. Thus, in the Reactor Safety Study, also known as the Rasmussen
Report, WASH-1400 (Rasmussen 1975), a special technique is used —the event-tree
and fault tree (Rasmussen 1981)— to predict the probabilities of rare accidents. This
study was reviewed and criticized (Lewis 1978, Glasstone and Jordan 1980) as being
deficient in several respects: (i) the use of inadequate data bases, (ii) the inability to
quantify common-made failures and human adaptability during the course of an acci-
dent, (iii, questionable statistical procedures.
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it), and P(A/E) and P(—A/E) for the probabilities of the events A and non-A,
in the given environment E.
In general, we shall find this situation for all the different actions Ai that
might be performed to arrive at some goal.
In modern technology a program must be developed in which design
analysis, studies and testing will identify system performance limitations, fai-
lure modes, safety margins, and critical operator tasks. All the known facets
of safety optimization must be considered in identifying, eliminating, or con-
trolling hazards. Systems safety management and engineering must be inte-
grated with other management and engineering disciplines in the interests of
an optimal system design.
13. Safety
Safety and risk go hand in hand in modern technology. In any techno-
logical design, procedures for the development and integration of system
safety must be developed to assure a program consistent with the overall
system requirements.
After a feasibility study, where a set of workable solutions to the design
problem are developed, evaluation of the safety of the system concepts under
consideration are needed. System safety verification includes, among other
things, the following:
(i) Preparing a system safety program plan.
(ii) Evaluating all materials, design features, procedures, operational
concepts, and environments under consideration which will affect
safety throughout the life cycle of the system.
(iii) Preparing a preliminary hazard analysis to identify hazards asso-
ciated with each alternative concept.
(iv) Identifying possible safety interface problems.
(v) Highlighting special areas of safety consideration, such as system
limitations, risks, and person-rating requirements.
(vi) Reviewing safe and successful designs of similar systems for con-
sideration in alternative concepts.
(vii) Defining the safety requirements based on past experience with
similar systems.
(viii) Identifying safety requirements that may change during the sys-
tem’s life cycle.
(ix) Identifying any design analysis, test, demonstration, and valida-
tion requirements.
(x) Documenting the system safety analyses, results, and recommen-
dations for each promising system concept.
(xi) Preparing a summary report of the results of the system safety
verification conducted during the program initiation phase to sup-
port the decision-making process.
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(xii) Tailoring the system safety program to the subsequent phases of
the system’s life cycle, and including detailed requirements in the
documents.
(See Appendix for system safety verification tasks during the validation
phase and engineering development.)
The system safety program plan is the management document that tells
what the system safety objectives are and the methods by which these objec-
tives will be pursued. This plan describes how the system safety program will
be established and carried out. It should describe:
a) The safety-management organization and how it relates to other
program functions.
b) The types of analyses required to identify and evaluate all hazards
associated with the system.
c) The specific hazards to be minimized and controlled to an accepta-
ble level.
d) The types of records to be established and maintained.
(See more on system safety in Brown 1976, Hammer 1976, Marshall
1982, Riddley 1983.)
1 3 . Sa fe ty a n d  p u b lic  p a r t icip a t io n
Efforts to enhance the public acceptability of decisions involve —in
addition to scientists, technologists, and experts— not only the leaders of
major associations and state and regional officials but also the general
public, in an attempt to get a consensus on controversial projects. Thus in
West Germany, in 1975, 927 consultant experts from industry, research, tra-
de unions and other interest groups were employed by the Ministry of Scien-
ce and Technology. In the Netherlands, the government organized an elabo-
rate public inquiry system on the principle that the public must be consulted
on all decisions affecting the environment. Government plans are preceded
by the publication of “policy intentions” dealing with political questions: the
objectives of growth, the goals of particular projects and their likely impact
(Nelkin 1977, Nelkin and Pollak 1977).
More and more participatory models have been developed during the
last decade. The traditional “welfare model”, in which risks were defined
mainly by experts, is nowadays becoming obsolete. A midway point between
technocracy and democracy is the approach to solve this kind of problem.
The main steps in dealing with controversial policies are the following:
(i) Statement of the problem. (Is opposition to a technological imple-
mentation really based on concern about risk or is it the surrogate
for more fundamental social concerns? Too often highly political
issues are defined as technical and questions about the impact of a
technology on community values are translated into arguments
about the degree of risk involved.)
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(ii) Participation of appropriate interest.
(iii) Management of consensus procedures. (Choice of commissioners,
supervising, and consulting agencies.)
(iv) Distribution of expertise. (Inadequate distribution of expertise
allows control of information.)
(v) Limits of choice. (Most inquiries are simply structured discussions
of predetermined policy with few real options. The financial and
administrative investments involved in specific technologies are
simply too profound to allow for a real margin of choice.)
(We deal in Tobar-Arbulu 1986b with technology assessment as the
framework in which technology implementation ought to be discussed.)
Let us emphasize here that when risks are known, legal criteria and
procedures for determining societal acceptability of risk are usually estab-
lished by governmental institutions performing legislative and/or judicial
functions (Green 1980).
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Appendix:
SYSTEMS SAFETY VERIFICATION
Systems safety verification during the validation phase should include
the following:
i) Prepare or update a plan to describe the integrated system safety
effort planned for this phase.
ii) Perform preliminary hazards analysis (see below), or update the
analysis performed during the program’s initiation phase. (Prepare a prelimi-
nary hazards analysis report of the proposed system and operational envi-
ronment).
iii) Identify technology, design, production and the risks affecting
safety.
iv) Establish system safety criteria for verifying that requirements have
been met.
v) Carry out trade-off studies to assess system safety requirements and
risk. Recommend system design changes based on these studies to ensure
that optimum safety is achieved as well as performance and system require-
ments.
vi) Identify, for inclusion in the appropriate specifications, both quali-
tative and quantitative system safety requirements.
vii) Perform subsystem, system, and operating and support hazards
analysis.
viii) Review all test plans to assure that tests are conducted safely.
ix) Ensure that identified hazards are eliminated or controlled.
x) Review training plans and programs for adequacy of safety
measures.
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xi) Evaluate results of failure and investigations recorded during the
validation phase. Recommend redesign or other corrective action.
xii) Ensure that system safety requirements are incorporated into the
system specification based on updated safety studies, analyses, and tests.
xiii) Prepare a summary report of the results of the system safety tasks
conducted during the validation phase to support the decision-making pro-
cess.
xiv) Refine the system safety program. Prepare a plan for the full-scale
engineering development and initial production phases.
Systems safety verification during full-scale engineering development
should include the following:
a) Ensure effective and timely implementation of the system’s safety
program for the full-scale engineering development phase.
b) Review preliminary engineering designs to ensure that safety design
requirements are incorporated and that hazards identified during validation
are eliminated or controlled.
c) Update system safety requirements in system specifications.
d) Perform or update subsystem, operating and support hazard analy-
ses and safety studies concurrent with the design/test effort to identify opera-
ting and support hazards. Recommend and require design changes and con-
trol procedures.
e) Identify testing facilities, test requirements, specifications, and crite-
ria to ensure that design safety is verified. Review the test plan and programs
to ensure safe execution of the tests.
f) Carry out technical design and program reviews, and present results
of subsystem, system, and operating, and support hazards analyses.
g) Identify and evaluate the effects of storage, packaging, transporta-
tion, handling, test, operation and maintenance on the safety of the system
and its subsystems.
h) Evaluate results of failure analyses recorded during full-scale engi-
neering development. Recommend redesign or other corrective action.
i) Identify, evaluate, and provide safety considerations for trade-off
studies.
j) Riew appropriate engineering documentation (drawings, specifica-
tions) to verify that safety considerations have been incorporated.
k) Review and provide safety inputs to preliminary system operation
and maintenance publications.
l) Verify the adequacy of safety and warning devices, life-support
equipment, and protective equipment.
m) Provide input to safety training courses.
n) Review preliminary production including purchase specifications,
process quality control, inspection and acceptance, and test procedures to
confirm that safety in the process and end product is established and main-
tained during production.
o) Ensure that requirements are developed for safe disposal of hazar-
dous materials and equipment.
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p) Prepare a summary report of the results of the system safety tasks
conducted during the full-scale engineering development phase to support
the decision-making process.
As for the preliminary hazards analysis, which provides and initial risk
assessment of a system, it should identify critical areas, evaluate hazards,
and identify the safety design criteria to be used. This preliminary analysis
established the framework for other hazard analyses and safety engineering
evaluation of design. It should consider the following for identification of
hazards:
i) Hazardous components (energy sources, fuels, explosives, high-
pressure conduits).
ii) Safety-related interface conditions among the various elements of
the systems (material compatibilities, static electricity, electromagnetic inter-
ference).
iii) Environmental constraints including normal operating environment
(temperature extremes, hazardous noise, illumination and humidity).
iv) Operating test, maintenance, and emergency procedures (human
error analysis of operation and maintance functions, life-support require-
ments).
The consequences of risk analysis may be summarized as follows:
A) Health effects
1. How many people are (will be) affected?
a) In the entire population
b) In sensitive groups
2. How much are they affected?
a) Morality
b) Morbidity
c) Severe pain and suffering
d) Psychological discomfort
e) Anxiety







g) Quality of life/health status
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4. When will they be affected?
a) Now
b) With some time lag
c) Future generations
5. How voluntary/involuntary is the risk?
6. How catastrophic is the risk (clustering of fatalities over time and
space).




2. Effects on nature.
3. Economic costs (and to whom).
4. Effects on economic growth, productivity/innovation.
5. Effects on business competition.
6. Effects on other countries.
7. Effects on distribution of income.
8. Effects on public satisfaction with government.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Ackoff, R. L. (1970). A Concept of Corporate Planning. New York: Wiley
and Sons.
—(1974). Redesigning the Future. New York: Wiley and Sons.
—(1981). Creating a Corporate Future. New York: Wiley and Sons.
Alexander, C. et al. (1975). The Oregon Experiment. New York: Oxford
Harvard University Press.
Alexander, C. et al. (1975). The Oregon Experiment. New York: Oxford
University Press.
—(1979). The Timeless way of building. New York: Oxford University
Press.
Ayres, R. and S. Miller (1982). Industrial Robots on the Line, Tech. Rev., 54
(4): 35-47.
Bindra, D. (1976). A Theory of Intelligent Behavior. New York: Wiley
Interscience.
Bright, J. R. (1967). Technological Forecasting for Industry and Govern-
ment. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc.
Brown, D. B. (1976). Systems Analysis and Design for Safety. Englewood
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc.
Churchman, C. W. (1961). Prediction and Optimal Decision. Englewood
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc.
Dror, Y. (1968). Public Policymaking Reexamined. California: Chandler.
Drucker, P. F. (1959). Long-range planning, Management Science, 5: 238-
249.
Fuller, B. (1983). Grunch and Giant. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
Galbraith, J. K. (1967-78). The New Industrial State. New York: Men-
tor Books.
—(1973-75). Economics and the Public Purpose. New York: Mentor
Books.
114 Jo sé  Fé lix To b a r  Arb u lu
—(1983). The Anatomy of Power. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co.
Glastone, S. and W. H. Jordan (1980). Nuclear Power and its Environmen-
tal Effects. New York: American Nuclear Society.
Green, H. P. (1980). The Role of Law in Determining Aceptability of Risk,
in Schwing and Alberts (Eds.), p. 255-267.
Grenier, L. E. (1972). Evolution and Revolution as Organization Grows,
Harvard Business Rev., 50 (4): 37-46.
Hammer, W. (1976). Occupational Safety Management and Engineering.
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc.
Hume, D. (1739-40). A Treatise of Human Nature, Ed. by L. A. Selby-Bigge
(1978). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Jantsch, E. (Ed.) (1967). Technological Forecasting in Perspective. Paris:
OECD.
—(1972). Technological planning and social futures. London: Cassell and
co .
Lenz, A. C. Jr. (1962). Technological Forecasting. 2nd. ed. Ohio: Clearing
House.
Leontief, W. (1977). Essays in Economics. Vol. II. New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
Lewis, H. W. (1978). Risk Assessment Review Group Report to the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Washington, DC: US Nuclear Regula-
tory Commission.
Lind, N. C. (Ed.) (1982). Technological Risk. Waterloo, Ont.: University of
Waterloo Press.
Marcovic, M. and G. Petrovic (Eds.) (1979). Praxis. Yugoslav Essays in the
Philosophy and Methodology of the Social Sciences. Dordrecht: Reidel.
Marshall, G. (1982). Safety Engineering. Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole Engi-
neering Division.
Martino, J. P. (1972). Technological forecasting for decision-making. New
York: Elsevier Publ.
Milenkovitch, D. (1971). Plan and Market in Yugoslav Economic Thought.
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Miller, G. A. et al. (1960). Plans and the Structure of Behavior. New York:
Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
Nelkin, D. (1977). Technological Decisions and Democracy. Beverly Hills:
Sage Publs.
Nelkin, D. and M. Pollak (1977). The Politics of Participation and the
Nuclear debate in Sweeden, the Netherlands and Austria, Public Policy,
25: 333-357.
Popper, K. R. (1974). in P. A. Schilpp (Ed.). The Philosophy of Karl Popper.
La Salle, IL: Open Court.
Raiffa, H. and R. Schlaifer (1961). Applied Statistical Decision Theory. Bos-
ton: Harvard Business School.
Rasmussen, N. C. (1975). Reactor Safety Study: An Assessment of Accident
Risks in the U.S. Commercial Power Plants, WASH-1400. Washington,
DC : National Research Council.
Planning and risk  115
—(1981). The Application of Probabilistic Risk Assessment Techniques to
Energy Technologies. Prog. Energy Comb. Sci., 6: 123-138.
Renyi, A. (1970a). Probability Theory. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publ.
Co.
—(1970). Foundations of probability. San Francisco: Holden-Day.
Riddley, J. R. (1983). Safety at Work. London: Butterworth.
Rowe, W. D. (1977). An Analysis of Risk. New York: J. Wiley and Sons.
Russell, B. (1938). Power: A New Social Analysis. London: G. Allen and
Unwin.
Schwing, R. C. and W. A. Alberts (1980). Societal Risk Assessment. How
Safe is Safe Enough? New York: Plenum Press.
Simon, H. A. (1969). The Sciences of the Artificial. Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press .
—(1976). Administrative Behavior. New York: Macmillan.
Stajanovic, R. (1982). Planning Economic in Yugoslavia, in R. Stajanovic
(Ed.). The Functioning of the Yugoslav Economy. New York: M. E. Shar-
pe.
Tobar-Arbulu, J. F. (1984a). Ontology of Artifacts. M.A. Thesis, McGill
University, Canada.
—(1984b). Purposeful machines, robotics and the like, Theoria (Spain)
(forthcoming).
—(1985a). Tecnología: Campo de Conocimiento Orientado hacia la
Action, DYNA (Spain) (forthcoming).
—(1985b). A value theory of actions, Philosophy and Social Action (India)
(forthcoming).
—(1985c). Technology: A Field of Knowledge, Theoria (Spain), (forth-
coming).
—(1985d). Technopraxiology and Development, Research in Philosophy
and Technology, No. 9 (forthcoming).
—(1985e). Conditional or relative probability, Contextos (Spain) (forthco-
ming).
—(1986a). Technopraxiology: Action theory from a technological point of
view. Ph. D. dissertation, McGill University, Canada.
—(1986b). Evaluation of Technology and Technology Assessment, Revis-
ta Internacional de Estudios Vascos (Basque Country). Tomo 31, No. 1,
p. 25-53.
—(1986c). Technoethics, Homenaje a Julio Caro Baroja. Revista Interna-
cional de Estudios Vascos (Basque Country) (forthcoming).
—(1986d). Human needs and development, Revista Internacional de Estu-
dios Vascos (Basque Country) (forthcoming).
Vidosic, J. P. (1969). Elements of Design Engineering. New York: The
Ronal Press.
Weisskopf, W. F. (1982). On Knowledge, Wonder and World Peace: An
Interview with Victor Weisskopf, Tech. Rev., 85 (4): 48-60.
Whyte, A. V. and I. Burton (1980). Environmental Risk Assessment. United
Kingdom: Chichester.
